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ABSTRACT
This paper looks at the specific situation of those European states
currently candidates for accession to the European Union. These
countries are expected to align their domestic laws and policies
with the EU “acquis” to fulfil the admission criteria. Foreign policy
is no exception. Indeed, the EU Common Foreign and Security
Policy has become an increasingly significant part of the accession
conditionality since the countries from south-east Europe
embarked on the membership course. Arguably, the obligation to
adapt to EU norms in the area of CFSP is stronger for candidates
than for existing members of the EU. As a result, candidates might
eventually enjoy more foreign policy autonomy once inside the
EU than they did before accession. There is a risk that this
discrepancy between the requirements of pre-accession
adaptation and the relative post-accession autonomy may have a
negative impact on integration in the field of foreign policy.
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1. Introduction
With the exception of Turkey, all states currently included in the EU accession process
[viz. Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, Kosovo and Serbia]
can be characterized as small – hence their inclusion in this special issue (Rieker & Hau-
gevik, 2017). Compared to the small states examined in other contributions, the situation
of candidates for EU membership is distinct in terms of adaptation and autonomy, par-
ticularly in the field of foreign policy.
In principle, candidates are free to make their own choices and decisions, like any other
state. However, once they embarked on the accession course, they became active norm-
takers, as the path leading to membership entails an ever-increasing degree of alignment
with EU positions (Cremona, 2003; Hillion, 2011). The result is arguably a de facto loss of
autonomy, including in foreign policy-making, irrespective of the size of the applicant
concerned. By contrast, once they have reached their goal of acceding to the EU, these
states will become EU norm makers, thereby retrieving a degree of autonomy in foreign
policy, at least as compared to their situation as candidates.
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Based on a legal-institutional analysis, this article suggests that the relative post-acces-
sion autonomy is particularly significant in the field of foreign policy because of the recur-
rent state-centric nature and procedures of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy
(CFSP). Indeed in recent years, the problématique related to adaptation and autonomy has
become more prominent for candidate states in foreign policy. On the one hand, the CFSP
dimension of the EU enlargement policy has developed substantively and normatively,
thus entailing stronger requirements of pre-accession adaptation for the candidates (1).
On the other hand, the autonomous position of Member States in relation to the CFSP
remains considerable, even if the Lisbon revision of the EU Treaties further embedded
that policy field in the EU constitutional framework (2). As a result, the shift from adap-
tation to autonomy has become starker as countries move from the pre-accession to the
post-accession phase. The legal discrepancy between accession conditions and member-
ship obligations in the field of the CFSP then raises the question of its implications on
the degree of integration in this field, and consequently on the ability of the CFSP to
“shelter” (Bailes, Thayer, & Thorhallsson, 2016) the foreign policy autonomy of small
European states (3).
2. Pre-accession adaptation
Since the countries from south-eastern Europe applied for membership, the EU CFSP,
including the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), has become an increasingly
significant element of the accession process. While this added prominence has not auto-
matically entailed that the candidates’ foreign policies have become submitted to that of
the EU, it remains that far-reaching adaptation is ultimately required from them to
advance on their respective path towards membership.
For each accession country, the EU Member States adopt a negotiating framework.
Typically, such a framework underlines that “accession implies the timely and effective
implementation of the acquis” (Council of the EU, 2014, pt 31). For the purpose of acces-
sion negotiations, the EU foreign policy “acquis” is covered by two of the 35 negotiating
chapters: Chapter 30 relates to “external relations”, including trade and development pol-
icies of the EU, while chapter 31 concerns the Union’s “Foreign, security and Defence
Policy” specifically. The latter covers the CFSP, including the CSDP, and comprises
legally binding international agreements concluded by the EU, Union’s decisions, and
notably restrictive measures, as well as EU political declarations and statements with
which the candidate has to adopt or align itself (EEAS, 2013; European Commission,
2017a).
Accession thus means that the candidate is expected to adapt its own foreign policy in
line with that of the EU, as articulated in those various instruments. Also, the aspirant state
must commit itself to denounce its international agreements in areas of EU competence
and in turn accept the international commitments of the EU, covering both “international
agreements concluded by the Union, by the Union jointly with its Member States, and
those concluded by the MS among themselves with regard to Union activities” (Council
of the EU, 2014).
Indeed, enlargement involves the EU projecting its norms (the “acquis”) towards the
state intending to become member. It entails that the candidate progressively adjusts to
EU policies and legal requirements. Such early adaptation is necessary not only for the
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state to enter the Union, but also to ascertain that as new Member State, it is able to
operate in the EU legal order from the moment of accession. The requirement of ex
ante alignment is made clear in one of the so-called Copenhagen criteria articulated by
the European Council in 1993 (Hillion, 2004a; Schimmelfennig, 2008), whereby to
accede a candidate must demonstrate: “The ability to take on the obligations of member-
ship, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union and the
administrative capacity to effectively apply and implement the acquis.”
It is also one of the key “principles governing the negotiations”. The negotiating frame-
work for Montenegro hence foresees that: “In the period up to accession, Montenegro will
be required to progressively align its policies towards third countries and its positions
within international organisations with the policies and positions adopted by the Union
and its Member States” (emphasis added) (Council of the EU, 2012, pt 7). This principle
entails that the candidate does not wait until accession to start the process of alignment.
Substantive and institutional adaptation must begin earlier.
The EUs expectations as regards early alignment with the EU foreign policy acquis are
further articulated in the annual “progress reports” of the Commission, in which it moni-
tors each candidate’s performance. For example, the 2015 report on Montenegro recalled
that “Member States must be able to conduct political dialogue in the framework of the
foreign, security and defence policy, to align with EU statements, to take part in EU
actions and to apply agreed sanctions and restrictive measures” (European Commission,
2015, p. 73). As regards this principle, the document concluded that Montenegro had a
good level of preparation, and listed several elements of the country’s foreign policy frame-
work and performance that were under scrutiny, i.e. the adoption of a law on international
restrictive measures, participation in civil and military crisis management missions, the
country’s track records as regards alignment to EU declarations and Council decisions,
including restrictive measures, participation in international export control arrangements
and instruments concerning non-proliferation, its compliance with international commit-
ments on small arms and light weapons, security sector reform and alignment with EU
security rules.
In sum, as the body of CFSP acquis has grown, so has the scope of the accession require-
ments in the field of foreign policy (Baun &Marek, 2013; Marciacq & Sanmartín Jaramillo,
2015). Yet in addition to the basic requirement that candidates progressively align their
foreign policy with the Union’s CFSP acquis (as per chapter 31), the EU has also intro-
duced various foreign policy conditions in the so-called “pre-accession strategy”,
thereby supplementing the general Copenhagen criterion recalled above. This develop-
ment of the contents of EU accession conditionality has tended to occur following devel-
opments “on the ground”.
Thus, in the wake of the Kosovo crisis at the end of the 1990s, the European Council
established that candidates ought to settle their bilateral disputes, as a prerequisite for
entering the Union, including through the involvement of the International Court of
Justice where necessary (Cremona, 2001, p. 231; European Council, 1999, pt 4). The
Union’s acknowledgment of the “European perspective” of the countries of the Western
Balkans further led to the establishment of specific eligibility conditions for the countries
concerned (Blockmans, 2007, 2009; Council of the EU, 1997; Council of the EU, 2003). In
particular, the process is taking place in, and is subject to the conditions of the wider
context of the so-called Stabilisation and Association Process which, as its name indicates,
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is geared towards regional stability and cooperation. In particular, the EU has insisted on
the requirement of good neighbourliness among the countries from the region (Basheska,
2014).
In the particular case of Serbia, the EU expects that it “normalise” its relations with
Kosovo in a way that comes close, without explicitly mentioning it, to a de facto recog-
nition, at least in the longer term, even if no such expectation has formally been formu-
lated in relation to the Member States (European Commission, 2009). The 2013
Negotiating Framework for Serbia, adopted unanimously by the Member States, mentions
that the process of normalization
shall ensure that both can continue on their respective European paths, while avoiding that
either can block the other in these efforts and should gradually lead to the comprehensive
normalisation of relations between Serbia and Kosovo, in the form of a legally binding agree-
ment by the end of Serbia’s accession negotiations, with the prospect of both being able to fully
exercise their rights and fulfil their responsibilities. (emphasis added) (pt 5)1
The very opening of accession negotiations was thus made subject to the condition that
Serbia “achieves further signiﬁcant progress in meeting the following key priority of
[taking] further steps to normalise relations with Kosovo in line with the conditions of
the Stabilisation and Association Process”. The Council indeed asked the Commission
and the High Representative to produce a special Joint Report “with a view to a possible
decision of the European Council to open accession negotiations with Serbia” (European
Commission and High Representative, 2013, pt 13).
The process of “normalisation” also has direct influence on the continuation of the
negotiations, being subject to stricter EU monitoring. Hence
in case progress in the normalisation of relations with Kosovo (…) significantly lags behind
progress in the negotiations overall, due to Serbia failing to act in good faith, in particular in
the implementation of agreements reached between Serbia and Kosovo (…) the Commission
[or possibly the High Representative] will on its own initiative or on the request of one third
of the Member States propose to withhold its recommendations to open and/or close other
negotiating chapters, and adapt the associated preparatory work, as appropriate, until this
imbalance is addressed. The Council will decide by qualified majority on such a proposal
and on the conditions for lifting the measures taken. (Council of the EU, 2014, pts 24 &
25; Hillion, 2011)2
In other words, the negotiating framework for Serbia makes it clear that EU institutions
may suspend the negotiations, and thus the process of accession, should they feel that
Serbia is not “normalising” its relations with Kosovo.
The foregoing makes clear that the process of accession possibly involves far-reaching
adjustments in the foreign policy of the candidate states. It entails not only alignment with
the EU acquis in areas covered by the CFSP (including with respect to restrictive
measures) (Hellquist, 2016); it also requires additional, and sometimes politically sensitive
adaptation notably to meet the requirement of good neighbourliness and regional
cooperation. The pre-accession conditionality thereby provides the EU with significant
leverage to press candidates to adapt their foreign policies (Maresceau, 2003) to guarantee
ultimate compliance with the CFSP and ensure that they become operational Member
States. In this context, the Commission and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs
and Security Policy closely and regularly monitor candidates’ adaptation to the pre-acces-
sion requirements.3 Progress – or lack thereof – is then recorded in annual reports to the
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Council and European Council, which may then use them to adjust the pace of the acces-
sion process, including by slowing it down or holding it up, should the level of alignment
be deemed unsatisfactory. A case in point is the stalling of the accession process of Mace-
donia as a result of a persistent disagreement on the name issue with one of its EU neigh-
bours, Greece (European Commission, 2014a).4
3. Post-accession autonomy
The CFSP does not entail the same degree of constraints onMember States as it does vis-à-
vis the candidates in the pre-accession phase. Rather than adaptation, the CFSP involves a
great deal of autonomy for the Member States.
In institutional terms, the classic supranational institutions of the EU, e.g. the Commis-
sion, the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice, have limited powers in
the development and implementation of the CFSP. Agenda setting and decision-making
remain essentially in the hands of inter-governmental institutions, and predominantly
rests on unanimity. Mechanically, this means that Member States enjoy a large degree
of autonomy in the field of foreign policy. Thus Article 24(1) Treaty on European
Union (TEU) foresees that:
The common foreign and security policy is subject to specific rules and procedures. It shall be
defined and implemented by the European Council and the Council acting unanimously,
except where the Treaties provide otherwise. The adoption of legislative acts shall be
excluded. The common foreign and security policy shall be put into effect by the High Repre-
sentative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and by Member States, in
accordance with the Treaties. The specific role of the European Parliament and of the Com-
mission in this area is defined by the Treaties. The Court of Justice of the European Union
shall not have jurisdiction with respect to these provisions, with the exception of its jurisdic-
tion to monitor compliance with Article 40 of this Treaty and to review the legality of certain
decisions as provided for by the second paragraph of Article 275 of the Treaty on the Func-
tioning of the European Union.
In particular, the supranational infringement mechanism whereby the Commission may
enforce Member States compliance with EU rules, with the potential assistance of the
European Court of Justice, has no equivalent in the CFSP/CSDP contexts. Observance
of the CFSP rests on good will, rather than legal and judicial enforcement. Declarations
attached to the EU Treaties indeed limit the normative effects of CFSP, thereby preserving
Member States’ autonomy in foreign policy. In this sense, Declaration 13 concerning the
CFSP stipulates the following:
The Conference underlines that the provisions in the Treaty on European Union covering the
Common Foreign and Security Policy, including the creation of the office of High Represen-
tative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the establishment of an Exter-
nal Action Service, do not affect the responsibilities of the Member States, as they currently
exist, for the formulation and conduct of their foreign policy nor of their national represen-
tation in third countries and international organisations. (emphasis added)
While Declaration 14 also “concerning the common foreign and security policy” foresees
that:
In addition to the specific rules and procedures referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 24 of the
Treaty on European Union, the Conference underlines that the provisions covering the
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Common Foreign and Security Policy including in relation to the High Representative of the
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the External Action Service will not affect
the existing legal basis, responsibilities, and powers of each Member State in relation to the for-
mulation and conduct of its foreign policy, its national diplomatic service, relations with third
countries and participation in international organisations, including a Member State’s mem-
bership of the Security Council of the United Nations.
Even if admittedly the principle of sincere cooperation enshrined in the Common Pro-
visions of the TEU5 buttresses the normative content and effect of the CFSP (Hillion &
Wessel, 2008), the leverage the EU has in relation to its Member States to ensure compli-
ance remains limited, at least compared to the one it enjoys vis-à-vis the candidates. While
the EU Council may decide to hold up the accession process as a result of a failure to align
with an EU foreign policy position, the EU institutions have no equivalent enforcement
mechanism to bring a Member State into CFSP line.
In substantive terms, while the CFSP is now formally envisaged as an EU competence,6 the
Union in effect only takes the position that itsMember States have in common. Thus, the EU
does not have a position of its own as regards the status of Kosovo because theMember States
do not have one single posture on the matter but several.7 Similarly, apart from the general
terms of Article 8 TEU the Union has not set out elaborate good neighbourliness standards
which the Member States have to follow when interacting inter se or with third states.
Hence, EU institutions have been unable to address Member States’ bilateral issues with can-
didates (e.g. Greece andMacedonia, Croatia and Serbia, Cyprus andTurkey, and Slovenia and
Croatia before the latter’s accession), and the ensuing holding up of the accession process
(Hillion, 2010).
Legally speaking and compared to most other policies of the EU, the CFSP therefore
involves fewer substantive and institutional constraints on the policies of Member
States (Koutrakos, 2017). The development of the CFSP continues to be contingent on
their consensual support, while its existence does not involve the classic imperative of
compliance associated with the functioning of the EU legal order in general.
4. Implications for EU foreign policy
Comparing the pre-accession conditions with the main membership obligations, it
becomes apparent that the in the field of CFSP, the former entails more constraints
than the latter. The EU thus enjoys a substantive and institutional leverage vis-à-vis the
candidates which is legally lacking, at least partly, in relation to the Member States.
This, in turn, entails that when they become Member States, countries from south-
eastern Europe will in effect enjoy more autonomy than they presently do as candidates,
regaining a degree of freedom in foreign policy-making which was, voluntarily, dimin-
ished the moment they embarked on an accession course and the adaptation it involves.8
Whatever their size, they will indeed acquire the national veto power associated with the
policy-making in the field of CFSP, while no longer running the risk of EU reprisal in case
of non-compliance.
If this basic observation is true, what impact could that phenomenon have on inte-
gration in the field of foreign policy, and ultimately on the autonomy of small European
states in this area?
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The documented experience of discrepancy in pre-/post-accession obligations in
other fields such as the protection of human and minority rights, or the rule of law
(Editorial Comments, 2012; Hillion, 2004b, 2013), suggests that setbacks in compli-
ance and loyalty may well ensue after entry (Kochenov, Magen, & Pech, 2016; Sedel-
meier, 2014). The regained exercise of autonomy in those fields may affect internal
cohesion, and impede policy-making in related fields, with destabilizing effects
within the EU as a whole, particularly given the sensitivity of the fields involved
for the functioning of the EU (European Commission, 2017b; Foreign Ministers of
Denmark, Finland, Germany and the Netherlands, 2013). Recent experience in
these fields has indeed shown that strict conditionality does not secure irreversible
pre-accession reforms, an assumption that seems to have underpinned the EU enlar-
gement strategy. On the contrary, the sustainability of candidates’ transformation
cannot be presumed, particularly in areas affected by the discrepancy observed
earlier, and especially if, as candidates, the countries concerned have been asked to
take positions that politically have been particularly costly, and without Member
States being subject to equivalent requirements.9
The observed “backsliding” (Müller, 2015), i.e. post-accession regression in fields where
pre-accession conditions are more articulate and constraining than membership require-
ments, has indeed triggered protracted discussions within the EU about ways to safeguard
post-accession compliance and loyalty (Closa & Kochenov, 2016). New mechanisms have
thereby been envisaged to secure substantive and institutional coherence between pre-
accession conditions and post-accession obligations, e.g. the mechanisms of Article 7
TEU, and additional ad hoc arrangements (European Commission, 2014b) thus far
without significant success (Besselink, 2017; De Witte, 2003; Hoffmeister, 2015; Kochenov
& Pech, 2016; Müller, 2015; Sadurski, 2010).
In state-controlled areas of EU competence like the CFSP, regained autonomy could
well find similar expressions as in fields evoked above. Indeed, whether and how much
the pre-accession conditionality genuinely influences the foreign policies of the candidates
in the longer term, in the sense of engraining adjustments in the foreign policy fabric of the
future Member States, remains to be seen (Sedelmeier, 2014). To be sure, one of the lessons
to be drawn from the experience of other fields where the phenomenon of pre/post-acces-
sion substantive and institutional discrepancy has been observed, is that possible remedies
are more difficult to establish after the situation they are deemed to address has occurred,
particularly if their establishment requires the support of all Member States. Anticipating
possible post-accession setbacks in foreign policy requires securing more institutional and
substantive coherence between accession conditions and membership obligations in the
field, e.g. by envisaging further convergence of the CFSP with mainstream EU consti-
tutional law. At one level, this development would admittedly lead to an erosion of
Member States’ autonomy in foreign policy-making. At the same time, however, the
failure to forge a common EU foreign policy, and the negative effects this could have
on the integration process more generally, could ultimately be detrimental to the very
regained autonomy of small states.
Notes
1. Pt 38 of the framework further underlines that
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In all areas of the acquis, Serbiamust ensure that its position on the status of Kosovo does
not create any obstacle nor interferewith Serbia’s implementationof the acquis.Any such
obstacles will be addressed in the course of the negotiations in the context of the chapter
of the acquis concerned. As part of its efforts to align with the EU acquis, Serbia shall in
particular ensure that adopted legislation, including its geographical scope, does not run
counter to the comprehensive normalisation of relations with Kosovo.
2. This is the so-called “new approach” proposed by the Commission as regards the chapters of
negotiations on judiciary and fundamental rights, and on justice, freedom and security,
which was extended to the issue of normalisation of relations between Serbia and Kosovo.
3. It is noticeable that the negotiating frameworks with Montenegro and Serbia stipulate that:
“In the field of CFSP, the High Representative is responsible, in close liaison with the Member
States, and the Commission where appropriate, for screening, making proposals in the nego-
tiations and reporting regularly to the Council”. Such HR involvement is new, and comes in
addition to the role that the Commission has traditionally played in monitoring the candi-
dates. It entails a distinct control of candidates’ CFSP adaptation which the HR does not exer-
cise in relation to the Member States.
4. In its 2014 Progress Report, the European Commission thus declared:
The EU accession process for the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is at an
impasse. Failure to act on the Commission’s recommendation to the Council means
that accession negotiations have still not been opened (…) It remains essential that
decisive steps are taken towards resolving the “name issue” with Greece. The failure
of the parties to this dispute to reach a compromise after 19 years of UN-mediated
talks is having a direct and adverse impact on the country’s European aspirations.
Resolute action is required, as well as proactive support from EU leaders. The Com-
mission recalls its view that, if the screening and the Council discussions on the nego-
tiating framework were under way, the necessary momentum could have been created
which would have supported finding a negotiated and mutually accepted solution to
the name issue even before negotiating chapters were opened.
5. According to Article 4(3) TEU: pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the Union
and the Member States shall, in full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks
which flow from the Treaties. The Member States shall take any appropriate measure,
general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or
resulting from the acts of the institutions of the Union. The Member States shall facilitate
the achievement of the Union’s tasks and refrain from any measure which could jeopardise
the attainment of the Union’s objectives.
6. Article 2 (4) of the Treaty of the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) stipulates that “The Union
shall have competence, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty on European Union,
to define and implement a common foreign and security policy, including the progressive
framing of a common defence policy”, but this CFSP competence is not included in the
basic catalogue of exclusive, shared, complementary competences set out in Articles 3 to 6
TFEU, thus illustrating its specificity in the EU constitutional order.
7. In this sense, the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the EU and Kosovo*
recalls in its Article 2 that
None of the terms, wording or definitions used in this Agreement, including the
Annexes and Protocols thereto, constitute recognition of Kosovo by the EU as an inde-
pendent State nor does it constitute recognition by individual Member States of
Kosovo in that capacity where they have not taken such a step. (OJEU 2016 L71/ 3)
8. Admittedly, candidates have not been totally submissive in the pre-accession phase; Serbia’s
reluctance to support EU sanctions against Russia is a case in point. The regional competition
for influence involving Russia and Turkey may have allowed some leverage for the candidates
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vis-à-vis the EU: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/08/top-mep-says-eu-must-
do-more-to-stop-russia-destabilising-balkans
9. Admittedly, newMember States’ administrations may have got more used to interacting with
active EU institutions, given the experience of pre-accession. In particular, the perception
that e.g. Commission played a benevolent role towards the candidates in the pre-accession
process might have generated a lasting degree of loyalty (Schimmelfennig & Trauner,
2009). Whether that could extend to the role of the High Representative, and to the field
of high politics remains to be seen.
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